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Waltham Forest Council (201900229)

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REPORT

COMPLAINT 201900229

Waltham Forest Council

16 May 2023

 

Our approach

The Housing Ombudsman’s approach to investigating and determining complaints is to decide what is fair in all the circumstances of the case. This is set out in the Housing Act 1996 and the Housing Ombudsman Scheme (the Scheme). The Ombudsman considers the evidence and looks to see if there has been any ‘maladministration’, for example whether the landlord has failed to keep to the law, followed proper procedure, followed good practice or behaved in a reasonable and competent manner.

Both the resident and the landlord have submitted information to the Ombudsman and this has been carefully considered. Their accounts of what has happened are summarised below. This report is not an exhaustive description of all the events that have occurred in relation to this case, but an outline of the key issues as a background to the investigation’s findings.

The complaint

  1. The complaint is about:
    1. the landlord’s handling of the resident’s reports of anti-social behaviour (ASB) and subsequent request for a move.
    2. the landlord’s complaint handling.

Background and summary of events

Background

  1. The resident was a tenant of the landlord, a local authority, from June 2015 until May 2021. The property is a one bedroom, ground floor flat.
  2. The landlord’s records show no flags for any vulnerabilities, however the resident is known to suffer from PTSD and anxiety.
  3. The landlord’s ASB policy outlines that its approach to dealing with ASB is to “reduce the need for legal action by offering support services in all appropriate cases (however) legal action can and will be taken in appropriate cases, where the complaint is sufficiently serious and all informal remedies are appropriate or have failed”.
  4. The policy states that it considers ASB complaints about gangs and “other criminal behaviour” to be high risk. High risk cases have a one day response time.
  5. In investigating ASB, the landlord has established a set of service standards which say that:
    1. it will “listen carefully” to understand the problem
    2. the resident will be written to within five working days of the first complaint to inform them of the next steps
    3. the resident will be contacted at “agreed frequencies and at a minimum every four weeks” to keep them informed and updated of any action that is being taken.
  6. Further the policy states that it will “put the victim at the centre of the investigation” and will aim to “act quickly” to agree an action plan with the resident. As part of the action plan, the landlord says it will:
    1. ask residents to complete diary sheets
    2. give useful numbers such as the police and victim support
    3. consider whether professional witnesses are necessary
    4. treat all information as evidence. This means it should be “recorded, dated, logged and confirmed”.
  7. The landlord’s ASB procedure advises that there are three stages to investigating ASB. These are:
    1. stage one early prevention (education) – with all cases risk assessed, the landlord can consider conducting interviews, writing warning letters and make referrals to appropriate agencies
    2. stage two non-legal remedies (intervention) – these can include acceptable behaviour agreements, mediation and final warning letters
    3. stage three legal enforcement action (enforcement) – if stage two does not result in resolving the issue, then it will consider taking preventative measures. These can include:
      1. possession orders
      2. criminal behaviour orders
      3. closure orders
      4. with or without notice injunctions.
  8. For “emergencies” the landlord states it will consider the following:
    1. a referral into temporary accommodation
    2. emergency repairs or security measures
    3. a referral to the social needs panel (SNP).
  9. The landlord has an allocations policy. It states that:
    1. residents placed in temporary accommodation will be made a one direct offer of alternative accommodation in line with recommendations of the SNP
    2. the resident has a right to request a review of the suitability of the offer. If it is deemed suitable, then the resident will be expected to accept the offer immediately
    3. in the case of a resident failing to accept a reasonable offer, the temporary accommodation will be withdrawn and no further offers of alternative housing will be made. The resident would have to make alternative arrangements for suitable housing or return to their former home.

Summary of events

  1. Records show that the resident has reported incidents of ASB as far back as 2016. An email from the landlord’s ASB and victim’s champion dated 22 September 2016 stated that:
    1. the resident had been referred to the victim support service due to the issues she was experiencing at home, and was writing a supporting letter for her case to be considered at the SNP
    2. she had reported groups congregating, who would smoke weed, get drunk and spit outside her front door. The resident had reported the main “leader” was a male who lived within the same block
    3. there were concerns about the resident’s five year old son, as the resident had informed them that the male had hidden a gun and a knife in her communal locker
    4. three of her friends had already been attacked. Two had been attacked by “bottling in the head”. The police had been called but they did not want to name the perpetrators for fear of repercussion
    5. the resident had been provided a personal alarm and a fireproof letterbox, but written consent was required from the landlord to install it.
  2. On 27 September 2016 the victims champion contacted the housing officer and asked for an update on the case. She asked for further updates on 24 October, 11 and 15 November 2016, and asked that the housing officer provide an outcome of the next SNP. The housing officer advised that the resident “will have to be patient and bear with us”.
  3. A police report dated 9 December 2016 said that when the resident had come into the station office she was “clearly upset and in a state of hysterics”. She was reporting that she was being targeted by a known gang. They knew where she lived and had smashed her kitchen window. A request for stronger police presence was passed to the safer neighbourhood team.
  4. On 21 December 2016 the housing officer made a referral to the SNP. It advised that:
    1. the resident was seeking to transfer to another property within the borough due to harassment and intimidation by her ex-boyfriend
    2. she suffers from PTSD and her present situation had increased her anxiety and flashbacks
    3. the resident had to call the police after some youths who were congregating outside her window threatened to stab her
    4. it was “obvious” that the safety of her child was a concern and that a move from the property was recommended.
  5. On 22 December 2016 the landlord’s housing options officer wrote to the resident and advised that she had not been awarded extra priority for a move at the SNP. It advised that she keep a diary log of further incidents.
  6. On 13 January 2017 the victims champion asked for an update as to why the SNP did not accept the resident’s case. After receiving no response, she made contact again on 2 February 2017 asking for an update.
  7. On 7 February 2017, the housing officer responded and advised:
    1. the resident had been informed by letter of the panel’s decision
    2. a repair had been ordered for the window and it “believed that it would have been carried out by now”
    3. in respect of the knife incident, it considered it to be a “matter for the police” and that it had heard nothing further from them.
  8. The landlord’s records show limited further updates until the resident contacted it on 2 August 2017 via an email she entitled “urgent help”. She advised that:
    1. since living in the property she had been a victim of homophobia and had been threatened verbally and physically by gang members with knives and with guns. She had also been a victim of criminal damage to her window
    2. the previous week she had been sitting outside with friends in the warm weather, and had left her front door slightly ajar. Suddenly, a boy was “running for his life” through the block and ran into her home for safety whilst another boy ran after him with a gun. When she screamed, the boy with the gun ran away
    3. she felt scared for herself and her son and wanted help to get out of “this horrid life threatening block”. She stated that the situation was causing her “major step backs” with her health and asked that someone called her ASAP
    4. she felt unsupported by her neighbourhood officer and their manager.
  9. The officer who acknowledged the resident’s query escalated the resident’s email internally to the community safety team (CST).
  10. On 7 August 2017 the resident contacted the landlord again. She advised that:
    1. the previous week she had told her housing officer that she had seen an “acid-type” substance on the gang’s youngest member. On 4 August 2017 her son and some other children were playing on the estate. One of them picked up a bottle of a suspicious substance and started to throw it at others. Her son swallowed some of it, so she had to attend A&E
    2. when she returned, at around 11.30pm, there were 25 gang members, spitting and being loud on the balcony. They shouted at the resident and called her a derogatory name and told her to get back in her house. One “put gun fingers up” and said “do you know who I am”, then all other members started throwing “everything and anything” they could find at her
    3. she was able to get into her house and call the police. She later fled the property to stay with a friend as she was so scared
    4. her neighbour told her that the day after she had gone, around 40 gang members appeared. They were heard saying “where is that woman? Get her out, we will kill her”. Her neighbour managed to take a photograph but it was blurry
    5. she’d had enough and couldn’t “do this anymore” and asked for help. She said that the police are aware of what had been going on.
  11. On 10 August 2017 an officer from the CST responded to a colleague by email and advised that:
    1. the team were aware of the resident’s complaints and there was a live ASB case in progress
    2. to date the allegations were “never reported to police” so it was difficult to corroborate her version of events. They continued to encourage the resident to engage with the police
    3. safeguarding referrals had been made but to “no avail”. An SNP had taken place some months ago but there was insufficient evidence to corroborate her allegations
    4. it would make another referral to the SNP “shortly” and hoped that in the meantime, the resident speaks with the police.
  12. On 16 August 2017 a project officer for the landlord responded to an MP enquiry asking for an update on the resident’s housing situation. It advised that:
    1. a police disclosure was sought on 11 August 2017 for which they will await a response before taking further action
    2. the housing officer had asked the safer neighbourhood team to make contact with the resident about the incidents she was reporting
    3. it had a close working relationship with the police, and believed that if there was an immediate threat or danger, then it believed the police would have contacted the landlord as a matter of urgency
    4. as things currently stood, it had no formal police report about any of the complaints raised by the resident.
  13. On 13 September 2017 the police contacted the landlord and advised that:
    1. the resident was still very frightened living in the property and had heard nothing further from the landlord
    2. the resident had complained that nothing had been done to replace a missing door to the block, leaving her feeling more vulnerable as she was now pregnant
    3. that a previous disclosure had been re-sent to the landlord with some additional facts which may assist in rehousing the resident.
  14. The police made contact again on 24 September 2017, and advised that:
    1. on the 22 September 2017 a party had been held in the flat above the resident, which went onto the early hours. Many men were in the courtyard adjacent to her flat and this was evidenced by condition of the grass the following morning. Silver foil sachets were found which were believed to contain drug mixtures to be put into drinks
    2. it is not known who held the party, and other residents had been unwilling to speak to the police due to fear of reprisals. However, the resident had made “many calls” to police about gang activity, reporting she had felt threatened
    3. there were gang members who reside and frequent the block, and records had shown there were over 75 calls to police over the last six months. Despite this, no arrests had been made as on police attendance, the suspects had fled from the many outlets and insecure doors in the block
    4. the whole block was insecure and there was “free, easy access” to get to it. The external door to the resident’s block had been completely removed and was always open, as had been the case for some months.
    5. a “weapons sweep” had found a hunting knife hidden in one of the pipe casings. A moped was also found hidden in the bushes of the property which had been used for drug supply
    6. the resident had often approached police openly in the block and spoken about the issues she had been facing. She may not have realised who may have heard her and so she was at risk of repercussion from those who frequent the block
    7. a recent warrant had taken place which strengthened the fact that criminals residing in the block believed the resident was supplying information to the police
    8. they had put special schemes (treat calls as urgent) flags on the system
    9. they believed that the resident and her son were vulnerable and recommended that she be rehoused as a matter of urgency.
  15. On the 27 September 2017 the police chased the landlord for a response to their disclosure. The housing officer made a referral to the SNP the following day.
  16. On the 9 October 2017, a medical assessor for the landlord wrote to the resident and advised that the SNP had been deferred as further information was required about where the resident was currently residing.
  17. On 20 October 2017, the housing officer made a new referral to the SNP. On 31 October 2017 her request for a move was declined, on the grounds that her case was not a high enough risk priority. It advised that the resident should pursue a mutual exchange.
  18. On 2 November 2017 the landlord noted the resident had referred herself to the safeguarding team due to the fear of violence. A “bronze group referral” for those at risk of gang violence was made by the landlord’s community safety officer the next day.
  19. On 9 November 2017 the police contacted the landlord and advised that the resident had informed them it had not been in contact. They advised that following an incident at the resident’s address, a suspect had been charged and was wanted by the police for “serious matters”. The same suspect had been seen in the local vicinity, so supported that the resident should be moved as a matter of urgency.
  20. On 1 December 2017 the police emailed the landlord to advise that they had been told that the resident’s case would be heard at SNP in the new year and this was a “long time to defer”. It asked that the matter be dealt with as a matter of urgency. Whilst the suspect had bail conditions, he had “little respect for the law and judicial system, let alone the resident”.
  21. On 8 December 2017, the housing officer responded to the police and advised that the resident had found someone to do a mutual exchange with, and “all being well” it would take place within 42 days.
  22. On 8 January 2018, the housing officer wrote to the police and advised that the resident had been made an offer of temporary accommodation, but this had been refused. It had advised that it was becoming “quite clear that the resident is not in any imminent or current danger in her home”, and that her “actions were not that of someone at risk of danger or harm”.
  23. Police records show that on 14 March and 13 April 2018 there were two serious gang related incidents in the area. One involved a shooting and a murder of a known gang associate, the other was an altercation involving a firearm.
  24. On 11 September 2018 the landlord issued a stage one response to a complaint about the decision of the SNP in October 2017. A record of the complaint itself was not seen. The letter stated:
    1. the resident was informed of the decision of the SNP by way of letter dated 31 October 2017 and was given 21 days to lodge an appeal, but she had not sought one
    2. the panel agreed at the time that the resident was not high enough risk for a move, but still offered her temporary accommodation at a later date which she had declined
    3. the complaint was not upheld, but could be escalated to stage two of its process for an independent investigation.
  25. The housing officer wrote to the resident on 9 October 2018 and advised that a since the resident’s reports of ASB, her case had been presented to the SNP and “numerous meetings to discuss the matter” had taken place. The case was therefore deemed concluded and its investigations were complete.
  26. On 21 November 2018, the same officer made another referral to the SNP. She stated that:
    1. the resident was seeking a transfer due to harassment and intimidation
    2. she was suffering from mental health issues and was registered with the mental health team for support. She had two young children, her daughter having been born in recent months
    3. groups of youths had been throwing stones at her window and calling her names. She had been a victim of homophobic abuse and had reported that her car had been broken into
    4. she was staying at a friend’s house for fear of her life and her children.
  27. On 2 February 2019 the resident reported to the police that at 4am she and her children were sleeping, and heard the front door being “banged in” and her candles were smashed. Her door was spat on and food was thrown at the door.
  28. A risk assessment was completed by the landlord about this incident, but it is unclear what date it was completed, or who completed it. The assessment highlighted that:
    1. the offender was known to the victim
    2. she had been targeted because she had been calling the police and was being called a “snitch”, she was also being targeted as she was a lesbian
    3. police references had been sought and were provided.
  29. On 7 February 2019, the housing officer visited the resident’s property but there was no answer. Its notes advised that for this reason, her ASB case would be closed. The officer managing the case sent a closure request to a manager, who approved that no further action was needed and the case could be closed on 15 February 2019.
  30. Four days later, the police contacted the landlord and advised that they had been getting numerous calls from the resident. They asked the landlord for an update on rehousing her.
  31. The housing officer replied on 4 March 2019 and advised that there was a lack of evidence the resident was at risk, and so the case had been closed. The police asked to speak to the new housing officer for the property. This prompted contact between the landlord and the resident. The landlord made a request for information to the multi-agency safeguarding hub (MASH) to advise:
    1. the resident was being harassed by youths in the area and had been supported by the police and victim support
    2. it required recommendations for the resident to be moved to alternative accommodation and asked if there were any recent incidents that may have put the resident and her family at risk.
  32. On 17 March 2019 police records demonstrate that the resident had contacted them to advise that she came home to find that her kitchen window had been smashed.
  33. On 4 April 2019 the resident complained to her landlord. No record of the complaint was seen, however the response that followed some weeks later noted that the resident was complaining that her landlord had been neglecting her family and wanted help to move.
  34. On 26 April 2019 a note from the landlord’s ASB lead stated that an incident of hate crime had been reported, and asked that the housing officers deal with it. No detail of the report was seen, and no evidence of contact was made with the resident.
  35. The landlord issued a stage one complaint response on 3 May 2019. It stated that:
    1. the SNP was concluded in October 2017, where it had decided that the case did not justify an additional property. The resident had the chance to appeal but had not done so
    2. it had maintained regular contact with the resident, the last contact being by telephone on 30 April 2019
    3. it felt that the correct procedures had been followed, and therefore the complaint was not upheld
    4. the resident should continue to pursue a mutual exchange or private rented options, and continue to report incidents of ASB to the police and housing team
    5. if she remained dissatisfied, she could escalate to stage two of the complaints process.
  36. No record was seen of an escalation to the complaint, and there is limited record of further incidents over the following six months.
  37. On 2 January 2020, the landlord provided temporary accommodation to “allow it time to investigate the resident’s allegations of ASB”. In the months that followed, although dates are unclear, the landlord did some door knocking within the block. During these investigations, a number of other residents informed the landlord that:
    1. the resident herself was a perpetrator of ASB. She could be heard screaming, playing loud music and smoking drugs from her flat
    2. the resident had some form of relationship with the people entering the block, and with one specific resident from who she had recently split up
    3. they would not be willing to be identified for fear of reprisals from the resident.
  38. The next recorded contact from the resident about ASB issues was on 1 April 2020 when she emailed the landlord to advise:
    1. the harassment had started again from the same group of boys. She had witnessed the same group beat up a man outside of her window the previous week
    2. she was “scared, absolutely terrified, and does not feel safe at home”. She felt she could not keep her children safe during the covid 19 lockdown
    3. the health and wellbeing of her and her children was being affected. She had been unable to use her therapy techniques of stepping outside to breathe to prevent an anxiety attack, because she was terrified of the gang of boys hanging around outside her home
    4. she asked for help in providing “safe temporary accommodation” where she did not have to live in fear.
  39. The housing officer responded to the resident by email the next day and advised that it was “only dealing with emergency issues at this critical time”. If she felt unsafe, she could contact the police who will then get in touch with the landlord if required.
  40. On 29 April 2020 the resident raised a formal complaint. She said that:
    1. since 2015 she had experienced homophobia, severe harassment, vandalism, mental and emotional abuse. The incidents “go up and down” but had recently worsened
    2. she had witnessed a lot of crime within the cul-du-sac. This included gang related activity which included use of weapons, intimidation and vandalism by around 25 males
    3. the gang had directly harassed her, they had threatened to stab and shoot her and would often walk around the estate showing their weapons as a threat. When she had called the police, they had always been able to run away
    4. she felt unsafe and wanted to move “once and for all”.
  41. The resident contacted the landlord again on 12 May 2020 and advised that the harassment had not stopped, it had worsened. She felt that her housing officer was patronising, putting the onus on her to evidence her police reports, when he could check the information directly with the police.
  42. On 12 May 2020 the housing officer responded to the resident and advised that he was not patronising her, however he still required details of the police reports she had made, and would wait until she “furnished” him with the necessary information.
  43. An internal email was seen on 18 May 2020 in which the housing officer informed a colleague that the requisites for the resident to apply for a move via SNP were very low. He would be willing to present her case, if she could demonstrate further evidence of her situation.
  44. On 29 May 2020, the landlord closed the resident’s request for a formal complaint. It stated that the issues raised would be treated as a service request, and that the resident should provide more evidence so that it could be investigated under the landlord’s ASB procedures.
  45. On 3 June 2020 the resident made another complaint, she asked to be safeguarded to “live in a safe and calm place” and to be rehoused because of the extreme ASB, harassment and intimidation she was facing. She stated she had had to leave the property again that evening for fear of her safety.
  46. On 5 June 2020 the resident emailed the landlord again and advised that:
    1. she was getting “constant threats and name calling by gangs who would call her a “snitch”, and have said “we will get you, watch”
    2. she had been spat at, and her front door had been defecated on. Her car had also been damaged
    3. her health was being affected and she felt she was “literally turning mad”
    4. she wanted every single issue she had since 2015 to date reviewing, so that the case could “be looked at properly once and for all” as part of the community trigger.
  47. The resident’s psychotherapist wrote a letter in support of a move for the resident on 11 June 2020. They stated that:
    1. the resident had a diagnosis of emotionally unstable personality disorder and PTSD
    2. her living situation was very stressful, she had been living in in overcrowded property with her children and limited support
    3. the resident had spoken of being targeted by gang members and did not feel safe in her flat
    4. for the sake of her mental health, and that of her children, they hoped that the landlord would be able to offer alternative accommodation.
  48. On 18 June 2020 the landlord’s ASB manager wrote to the resident and advised that the criteria for a community trigger had not been met. Despite this, it said that:
    1. her housing officer would continue to explore housing options available to her
    2. the police would carry out more patrols in the area and take action against the perpetrators, in conjunction with the landlord
    3. it would refer her to a victim champion for support.
  49. The landlord closed her complaint on 30 June 2020 and noted that the issues the resident was complaining about were historic, and that any new reports would be dealt with in line with ASB procedures.
  50. However on 15 July 2020, the landlord wrote to the resident as part of a stage one complaint response. It had advised it had considered her historic ASB complaints and concluded:
    1. it would not investigate issues prior to 2018 as these were outside of the council’s complaint policy
    2. the resident had been in regular contact with her housing officer. He had made several unannounced visits to the area and had not find any evidence of ASB
    3. the housing officer had written two letters to residents, in March and May 2020 to encourage reporting of ASB, but no other reports were forthcoming. He had requested an increase in police patrols, which was ongoing
    4. no evidence of police reference numbers had been provided by the resident. Therefore, considering the lack of evidence, the complaint was not upheld
    5. details of how she could escalate the matter to stage two were provided.
  51. Records show that the resident made contact with police in August and September 2020 but stated that she was unwilling to freely talk to the police until she was moved for fear of reprisals.
  52. On 15 September 2020 the police wrote to the landlord and advised:
    1. the resident was extremely scared for her safety and it was the opinion of the police she was vulnerable. There were serious concerns for the resident and her children, and it was believed she was living in a “volatile situation due to outside behaviour”  and were at high risk of violence
    2. the police database revealed a long list of incidents reported by the resident which included criminal damage to her property, threats and victimisation. Due to the nature of the incidents, it was limited on what it could divulge
    3. there were real concerns for her safety and it was in the best interests for the family to be moved to be protected from further incidents and trauma
    4. it was clear the situation “would not be resolved swiftly” and it was hoped they could work with the landlord to rehouse her urgently.
  53. The housing officer responded to the police the next day and advised it needed the police reference numbers in order to progress a consideration for a move. It also advised it wanted to establish if other residents were involved in the ASB.
  54. The police responded to the landlord on 17 September 2020. They advised that they would not provide further detail of the incidents until it could be sure the resident would be moved, as there was a high chance of escalation of the incidents she had been reporting, if not handled appropriately. They believed the resident would be more likely to engage if she was moved and that “safety was paramount”.
  55. On 17 September 2020 the housing department advised the resident’s advocate that they did not have sufficient evidence to make a referral to temporary accommodation. However the resident could approach the homeless persons unit for emergency accommodation.
  56. On 23 September 2020 the landlord conducted a risk assessment matrix (RAM) with the resident over the phone and scored her as high risk.
  57. On 2 October 2020 the housing officer wrote to the resident, referring to a visit that took place the day before. A record of the visit was not seen. The landlord advised that it was including an action plan, and advised that the next steps were:
    1. witness interview (“possibility”)
    2. letter inviting the perpetrator to an interview (“possibility”)
    3. issue an acceptable behaviour contract (“possibility”)
    4. write letter to perpetrator reminding them of their tenancy condition (“possibility”)
    5. request police disclosure
    6. professionals meeting
    7. temporary accommodation referral
    8. SNP
    9. actions would be completed within the “agreed timescales” and regular contact would be maintained until a satisfactory conclusion had been reached.
  58. Following an SNP, on 2 November 2020 the landlord made an offer of alternative secure accommodation to the resident. The offer letter advised that:
    1. the resident should consider the property carefully as it will be the only direct offer of accommodation
    2. her current high priority for a move would be removed following any refusal of the property.
  59. The following day, the resident attended A&E. She reported that she had a panic attack and had difficulty breathing, having received the landlord’s offer of accommodation. A report from the doctor advised that:
    1. the resident had informed him that she had been a victim of gang activity and had been staying in temporary accommodation for the previous six weeks
    2. the landlord had offered her a new property but it had one bedroom and would not solve her overcrowding. It was also in an unsafe neighbourhood
    3. she felt she was being “threatened” by the landlord to accept the property and wanted assistance to move somewhere safe.
  60. An internal email from a senior housing officer dated 5 November 2020 advised that:
    1. the resident had not informed the housing department of any ASB related to gangs. Her issues were due to a “relationship breakdown” she had with a number of other residents in the block
    2. there was no evidence to show there were any gang issues or risks to her. If there was, she needed to report this to the police
    3. the offer of accommodation was not made because of the resident suffering from ASB. She was moved in the “best interests of the block” because of her relationship breakdown with other residents
    4. there was evidence to show that the resident herself was the perpetrator of ASB on the estate.
  61. On 6 and 10 November 2020 the landlord contacted the police and asked them if there was any information relating to gangs, risks, or areas that they should avoid in rehousing the resident. The police responded and advised they had already provided it with their opinion on the matter. They said there was no further investigation that was being carried out by the police that would help the landlord take its investigations further.
  62. On 19 November 2020 a member of the landlord’s “gangs team” advised that;
    1. there were no issues from gangs for the last six months at the resident’s address, or at the property she was to be moved to
    2. it was not aware of other issues but a particular police constable was best placed to answer whether there were any risks, as he had numerous reports for the resident and had flagged her as a vulnerable adult
    3. it did not think the issues the resident had reported to the police were to do with gangs.
  63. On 26 November 2020 the resident’s GP wrote a supporting letter for a move and advised that:
    1. the resident was experiencing spouts of vomiting and anxiety attacks. She was living in “fear of death”
    2. she was being reviewed by a psychiatrist and her mental state was fragile
    3. they were supportive of an urgent move to appropriate long term accommodation.
  64. On 2 December 2020, the police advised that there was gang related activity at both locations (at the resident’s property, and at the proposed new address) but they could not directly link any activity to the resident.
  65. On 18 December 2020 the landlord wrote to the resident about the offer of alternative accommodation. It advised that:
    1. the agreement of the SNP was that she was offered one direct offer only. This was a one bedroom property on a like for like basis, away from the current location of her home
    2. additional factors of overcrowding and medical need were not being taking into account and resolved as part of the like for like move. The move was intended to safeguard the resident from the current risk she was experiencing
    3. during the panel, there were no other areas highlighted as a potential risk to her, as a result the offer was deemed suitable
    4. no areas of the borough were free from the prevalence of gangs. In any event, the move away was not directly linked to gang activity and there had been no evidence seen that supported she would be at additional risk from accepting the property it was offering
    5. it had consulted the gangs team, the police and the housing management team and there was no evidence of any risk of gangs to her
    6. it had noted the resident had bid on other properties in the same area in which it was offering, which she had now stated was unsuitable. It therefore was of the opinion that the alternative accommodation offered was appropriate
    7. the offer of the accommodation would remain for a two working days, and if refused then priority points would be removed and the accommodation would be offered to someone else
    8. immediate steps would be taken to cancel the temporary accommodation she was in, and she would have to return to her substantive address if she did not accept the direct offer.
  66. On 23 December 2020 the resident emailed the landlord and advised that:
    1. she felt that the landlord had acted unlawfully and against its own policies. She said “more could have been done” to protect her and her family
    2. a male residing in the block where she lived had been charged with murder. The landlord had completed a door knocking exercise which had aggravated the gangs, and she was not safe as she felt the perpetrators were aware she had given intelligence
    3. it had failed to protect her and her family from further violence. She had been ignored and left to suffer where no action was taken
    4. she did not want to be “forced back to the borough” where her family were unsafe and would be at great risk of harm knowing how dangerous the perpetrators were.
  67. On 14 January 2021 the resident signed the tenancy agreement for the new property. During the sign up, the housing officer reported that:
    1. the resident had said that she was being forced to take the property, and that the landlord was mistreating her by not considering anything she had to say
    2. the resident said that she had been raped in the past and that the rapist lived around the corner
    3. there were gang members who were “after her”, who had killed someone not long ago. She said if anything happened to her, it would be the landlord’s fault
    4. the resident mentioned she had been living at various other locations, and would continue to do so as she felt unsafe, and would not be residing in the property
    5. the resident was shouting, crying and her “emotions were all over the place”
    6. she and her colleague doing the visit “did not feel comfortable at all” but continued to do the sign up to complete it.
  68. An internal email was sent by a senior solicitor for the landlord to its gangs team on 15 January 2021. It confirmed that the resident had named a suspect and two associates who had since been arrested for murder and provided this to her housing officer. All persons had links to her new address. The email stated:
    1. the landlord didn’t have any of this information when they last spoke to the police, and it should have been information that was readily available
    2. they appreciated “there was more than one reason to consider [the resident] a less than reliable source of information, not least her mental illnesses”
    3. the gangs team should seek corroboration from a more reliable source, and needed to go back to the police to see if the latest information the resident had provided altered their view about any risk posed in her new accommodation.
  69. The resident contacted the Ombudsman for advice with her housing issues, she felt she had been “forcefully evicted” from her home due to the mismanagement of the ASB, and her complaints were not being taken seriously. The Ombudsman prompted the landlord to provide a response to the resident. A stage one complaint response was sent on 8 February 2021. It advised that:
    1. the resident was not “forcefully evicted” from her substantive home, as she had claimed. The offer of another property was in direct response to a management move request due to the ASB she was experiencing
    2. the resident had not appealed against the decision for a move, but had requested a review of the offer of accommodation, which had been explained to her in a letter dated 18 December 2020.
    3. it had considered the issues that the resident had raised were concluded and that her complaint was not upheld. If she remained dissatisfied, she could escalate the matter to stage two of its complaint process.
  70. The resident contacted the Ombudsman and sought advice as to how she could escalate her complaint due to the ASB she was experiencing. On 16 February 2021, the Ombudsman requested that the landlord issue a stage two response.
  71. On 4 March 2021 the police wrote to the landlord with support from social services to support the resident’s request for rehousing. The officer stated that:
    1. previous disclosure requests had already been provided to the landlord. Police intelligence supported that the resident was not an active gang member
    2. gangs were aware of where the resident lived and had identified her as an emotionally vulnerable person. She was considered to be a ‘traitor’ to the gang having historically had relationships with gang elders, and because she had tried to keep young people away from the gangs
    3. the gang network and hierarchy supported the resident’s claims that she was being targeted by younger gang members, some unknown to her, and that they carried weapons or drugs as a ‘test of loyalty’ to the elders
    4. there had been serious gang related activity, including stabbings and murders linked to the gang as well as street level drug dealing. Due to the altercations and specifically the murders, of which some of the gang members were convicted, tensions were high between the various gangs
    5. he believed that the resident had been identified and was being targeted and ‘vilified’ by the same violent gangs. He had created a map to illustrate the geographical areas of risk to the resident, these included the area in which she resided. He supported that the family needed to be moved away from the entire Waltham Forest Borough area
    6. the gangs would not allow the resident to “just walk away” from their control and influence. The knowledge the resident had of the gang network would mean that her family were at risk of danger in the future should she remain in the area. He identified further areas across the county which he believed to be “unsafe relocation options”
    7. he was fully supportive of a move and felt that the resident was “highly likely” to be targeted if she were to remain at the same address.
  72. On 18 March 2021, the landlord wrote to the resident at stage two of its process. Its response did not address its handling of the ASB, but advised that it was considering her complaint on the basis that she had been unsuitably rehoused as the property was located close to where she was a victim of a previous sexual assault. The landlord said:
    1. it had considered previous complaint responses sent to the resident and feedback it had received from the legal services team and felt that it’s actions had been carried out in accordance with its allocation policy
    2. the resident had not mentioned when asking for a review of the accommodation, that it was close to someone who had assaulted her. Therefore the landlord made an appropriate decision based on the information it had available to it at the time
    3. the resident accepted the offer of the new property, and subsequently gave the landlord possession of her previous home. However now she was stating she was homeless, and staying away from the property. Whilst it awaited further information from the resident’s solicitor about this, it had made arrangements for a further referral to the SNP which would take place on 29 March 2021. The resident had been given a deadline to provide evidence for the hearing
    4. the complaint was concluded, however the resident could complain to the Ombudsman if she was unhappy with the response.
  73. A letter from the landlord to the resident on 16 April 2021 confirmed that her request for alternative accommodation had been agreed at an SNP that took place on 29 March 2021. It advised it had checked with the police which areas were suitable and she would be offered a new property as appropriate as soon as possible.
  74. In April 2021 the resident presented as homeless to another local authority, out of area, and ended her tenancy with the landlord on 16 May 2021.

Assessment and findings

  1. In reaching a decision about the resident’s complaint we consider whether the landlord followed proper procedure and good practice and acted in a reasonable way. Our duty is to determine the complaint by what is, in this Service’s opinion, fair in all circumstances of the case.

The landlord’s handling of the resident’s reports of anti-social behaviour (ASB) and subsequent request for a move.

  1. Key to the ASB, Crime and Policing Act 2014 is multi-agency working between local authorities, landlords and the police. Where the landlord is a local authority, it has separate teams responsible for housing, community safety (including a gangs team) and victim support to assist with dealing with ASB. This is a common approach, however landlords must ensure that their teams do not work in silos and there is co-ordination across specialisms who work closely with each other and with partnership agencies, to tackle issues.
  2. Timely sharing of information and a victim-centred approach is essential to identify risk and take action within an appropriate time frame. In this case, there was evidence of a lack of coordination between the landlord’s own teams and the police, which ultimately failed to resolve the resident’s case over a significant period of approximately five years, causing her considerable distress.
  3. The landlord was obliged to prioritise and effectively investigate reports of hate crime, gangs and “other criminal behaviour” as stated in its ASB policy. Whilst it is accepted that much of the enforcement action against identified perpetrators would require significant action from the police, the landlord failed to recognise the gravity of the resident’s situation and identify that there were crucial steps that it could take to investigate the issue itself. By often referring the matter back to the police as the sole agency responsible for dealing with the issues, it exacerbated the resident’s situation, left her feeling unsupported and placed her at increased risk. An example of this is evident in the email sent by the resident’s housing officer on 2 April 2020 which advised that it was “only dealing with emergency issues [during the pandemic] and to refer to the police”, in response to her feeling “scared, absolutely terrified and unsafe at home” due to an escalation of gang activity.
  4. This response was inappropriate and insensitive, and did not seek to gain the confidence of the resident as highlighted in its ASB policy to “be interested and prepared to listen” and be “knowledgeable and competent about the subject area”. Putting the onus back on the resident to contact the police demonstrated a lack of empathy to her situation and a disregard for the severity of the issues she was facing. Further, there is evidence that the landlord put the onus on the resident to provide them with the details of the police reports several times, but made little attempt to work in collaboration with the police themselves until the latter part of 2020.
  5. The nature of the hate crime, gang related violence, threats and intimidation the resident was reporting was serious, and the landlord should have provided ongoing support for the resident in accordance with its policy. A RAM can be completed with a resident to measure the harm caused and can assist in guiding staff on the actions it can take to support residents and protect them from further harm. However, the landlord’s records show that in the five years she was reporting the issues, only one RAM was completed in September 2020, which scored her as high risk.
  6. The delay in doing a RAM in the years prior and upon receipt of every new report of serious allegations of ASB was significant, and hindered the landlord’s ability to recognise the level of risk presented to the resident. By continually referring the matter back to the police, it failed to take responsibility and offer her appropriate support, adding to her distress over a prolonged period of time.
  7. There were fundamental failures in the landlord’s communication with the resident. The landlord’s ASB policy states that on receipt of a report of ASB, it will make contact and write to the resident within five days to inform them of the next steps and agree a frequency of communication and updates through an action plan. The action plan is a fundamental part of ASB case management, which the landlord failed to undertake in accordance with its policy and despite several opportunities to do so.
  8. The single action plan seen dated 2 October 2020 was incomplete and offered little reassurance to the resident. By listing certain actions as being a “possibility”, it failed to provide the resident with clarity on what actions it would be taking within specific timescales. The possible actions the landlord listed did not go far enough to investigating the matter and failed to consider other steps it could have pursued, including reviewing the security measures it had in place in the block or the use of a professional witness.
  9. It is of concern that the landlord was not able to demonstrate fully its interactions with the resident. Contemporaneous notes of visits to the resident and telephone calls were not seen, which point to failures in the landlord’s record keeping. Its failure to keep notes impacted its ability to share information with its own colleagues in its specialist teams, who were heavily reliant on accounts given by individual members of staff over several emails.
  10. The reliance on opinions of staff across emails impacted the landlord’s ability to effectively review the resident’s case holistically and appropriately use evidence to take appropriate action. Particular staff made comment that the resident had “never reported the issue to the police” and had not reported issues with gangs, and this had been taken as fact by the landlord. When conversely, the police corroborated that she had made “many” concerning calls about the issues, as was evidenced as far back as September 2017. This showed a lack of effective multi-agency partnership working and timely requests for disclosure, for which the landlord should have been proactive in establishing at the earliest opportunity.
  11. The landlord’s SNP considers whether a resident is occupying unsatisfactory housing that poses an “ongoing and severe threat to the wellbeing of the resident and their household”, and whether they need to be rehoused urgently. It was therefore appropriate that the landlord made referrals to the SNP given what the resident had been reporting, and from the supporting evidence it had on several occasions from the police, victim support and medical professionals.
  12. The landlord’s own victim support champion supported a referral to the SNP in 2016, and it was clear that the resident was in a serious situation, reporting that she felt a very real threat of violence. The landlord’s suggestion of keeping diary sheets and pursuing a mutual exchange was not an appropriate response to serious threats of violence, and demonstrated that at an early stage in the handling of this case, the landlord did not recognise the severity of the issues the resident was presented with. No evidence was seen that the landlord followed up the resident’s early reports with any requests for police disclosure, or that it took any further action.
  13. Evidence demonstrates that it was the police who had approached the landlord in 2017 for consideration for a move “as a matter of urgency”, following an escalation of events over the previous months. This particular referral is significant to this case, as it demonstrates that the landlord had substantial evidence from the police that there was gang related activity taking place on the estate involving weapons, and the resident was at serious risk. Yet, the panel hearing did not take place until 31 October 2017, a further 27 working days after the police report, demonstrating a lack of urgency on the matter before concluding that the resident was “not deemed high enough risk”.
  14. It is not clear how the landlord came to this conclusion, given that it had not sought the outcome of any RAM or demonstrated any communication with the resident, to the extent the police had to chase it for a response in the following weeks. Further, the landlord failed to demonstrate what steps it had taken to investigate the ASB that was taking place on its own estate, until it responded to the resident in its stage one response dated 15 July 2020.
  15.  A further eight SNP referrals took place between December 2017 and March 2021. The panel hearings often took place in the weeks following a serious report, and later declined, before the resident’s case was referred back for consideration some months later. No record was seen of the SNP hearings and therefore it is not known what evidence the landlord relied on when considering her case. For example, it is not clear that the police report dated 24 September 2017 was ever considered in the earlier stages of this case. The lack of urgency in considering a move for the resident was key to the failures of this case and did not show that it understood the gravity of the situation. The resident was left living in fear of her life with increasing mental health issues and evidently felt unsupported.
  16.  The timeline points to large gaps of inaction and effective record keeping by the landlord. An example of this is evidenced between April 2019 and May 2020. It was during this time, in January 2020, that the landlord placed the resident in temporary accommodation “to allow it time to investigate the ASB”. To have placed her in temporary accommodation indicated that there was a significant risk to her during this time, however no evidence was seen that demonstrated what prompted this move. Whilst it is accepted that at some point immediately following her move to temporary accommodation, the landlord conducted a door knocking exercise and requested an increase in police patrols, it did not go far enough in its investigations into the issue, and a decision about an offer of more permanent accommodation was not agreed until November 2020. This delay was considerable, and added to the resident’s distress during a period of uncertainty whilst she waited for the landlord to consider her housing options.
  17.  An anti-social behaviour case review (formerly known as the community trigger) gives victims the right to request a multi-agency case review where the threshold is met to do so. The government guidance states that in order to meet the threshold, all relevant agencies must consider the frequency of the complaints, the effectiveness of the response and the potential harm to the victim making the complaint. It is not clear why the landlord deemed the resident’s case to have “not meet the criteria” for the community trigger in June 2020, given the seriousness of the allegations and the amount of time that had already passed. This was a missed opportunity for partner agencies to have reviewed the resident’s case collectively to establish risks and further actions required.
  18.  During its investigations, the landlord formed the view that the resident required a move due to a “relationship breakdown” with other residents on the estate and identified her as the perpetrator of some of the issues on the estate. However no evidence was seen as to how it brought the allegations to the resident, sought to obtain her response or corroborate these specific allegations with the police, and no evidence was seen that it took any further action against her tenancy.
  19.  The timeline during 2020 in particular demonstrates that the police had made it clear to the landlord that there was gang related activity on the estate, but due to the nature of investigation, it could not divulge specific details without ensuring the resident’s safety was not compromised. There was a conflict of information between the information it had received from the police in September and the landlord’s gangs team, who advised in November that there was no gang activity for six months. This difference of opinion in a crucial multi-agency partnership is of serious concern. The landlord failed to identify this difference in information and did not seek to explore the matter further, taking the latter information from the gangs team as fact in its decision to rehouse her.
  20.   In November 2020, the landlord agreed to move the resident to another one bedroom property. The landlord was acting in accordance with its allocations policy when it offered alternative accommodation on a like for like basis from her substantive home. Its intention was to remove the resident from the high risk situation she was faced with, and was consistently clear that it could not resolve her overcrowding situation at the same time.
  21.  In deciding whether the offer of rehousing was appropriate, the landlord sought clarity from the police on its opinion of the area it intended her to move to. From the evidence seen, the landlord sought this clarification from a particular officer by email, and not via any formal disclosure routes. The risk of doing this, as was later seen, is that it did not approach the officer who was best placed to answer this.
  22.  The landlord did not sufficiently consider the impact the ASB had on the resident’s vulnerabilities during its handling of its case. No response was seen to evidence from medical professionals, highlighting the impact that the issues were having on her mental health conditions. Further, no vulnerability flags were placed on the landlord’s system which highlighted that the resident suffered from mental health issues. It would have been appropriate to have done so, so that all professionals involved in the case could have been aware of the potential impact and risks facing the resident.
  23.   It is of concern that the landlord continued with the sign up of the new tenancy, despite the distress the resident displayed, and to the extent that the visiting staff reported that they felt “uncomfortable”. It offered the resident no ongoing support, and by failing to do so demonstrated a lack of empathy to the situation she was faced with.
  24.  Shortly after the sign up, it is evident that the resident’s mental health diagnosis impacted the landlord’s view of what she was reporting. This is evidenced in the email dated 15 January 2021 whereby a senior member of staff commented “there is more than one reason to consider [the resident] a less than reliable source of information, not least her mental illnesses”. This comment was inappropriate and unsympathetic, and supported the sentiments of the resident that she was not believed or taken seriously.
  25.   The same member of staff instructed that information from a “more reliable source” should be sought. It is not clear if this was in reference to the resident, or the particular police officer who had earlier provided his thoughts on the resident’s move by email. However the in-depth report provided the by police that followed in March 2021 was clear in its explanation of what gang activity is, how they operate and what risks were posed to the resident by residing at both her previous and new address. It’s view was that the risk was so high, the resident had to be housed completely out of area. The landlord would have been aware of this information much sooner had it worked more proactively and in cooperation with the police.
  26.   As a result, the impact on the resident was great. She had to endure years of feeling unsafe in her own home, scared of what might happen to her or her young children. She suffered a significant decline in her mental wellbeing, as was evident by medical reports. Further, she suffered the upheaval of having to stay away from her home, sofa surfing and in temporary accommodation for genuine fears for her own safety. When the landlord finally sought to move her to permanent accommodation, it did so without a full picture of the risk posed to the resident and caused her further significant distress.
  27.   Overall, there were serious failures in handling reports of serious gang related activity on the estate which date back as far as 2016 and have resulted in considerable detriment to the resident, and amount to severe maladministration. Its lack of understanding about gangs was evident throughout the handling of this case. The landlord was slow to act on serious allegations of violent and hate crime throughout its investigations, lacked empathy towards the resident and ultimately culminated in an inappropriate offer of alternative accommodation five years after her first reports.
  28.   In considering compensation in this case, it is important to note that the Ombudsman does not award payment for damages in a way a court might. However, it is recognised that the resident was likely to have been feeling distressed, anxious and upset during the period of time the harassment was ongoing. Her concerns about the safety of herself and her children were valid, and she suffered distress on a daily basis where she felt the landlord was not taking her reports seriously. Had the landlord been more proactive in its approach, identified the risks, and helped her move to more appropriate accommodation at an earlier date, the impact on the resident could have been reduced.
  29.  Therefore to remedy the cumulative failures highlighted in this report, compensation has been ordered as follows:
    1. £200 for every month for a period of 55 months, which covers the history of the landlord’s involvement in this case from September 2016 to April 2021
    2. the amount totalling £11,000 to be paid directly to the resident.

Complaint handling

  1.   It is evident that the resident made several expressions of dissatisfaction with the landlord’s handling of her ASB case over several years. When receiving a complaint about ASB, it is important that the landlord distinguish whether the resident is complaining about the ASB itself, or the handling of the landlord’s ASB case. The danger of not recognising the difference can lead to early closure of formal complaints and the matter being dealt with as an ASB service request, as was seen in the handling of this case.
  2.   It is difficult to establish all contact the resident made with the landlord about the handling of her ASB case from the evidence provided, but it is clear that there were missed opportunities for it to investigate her concerns as a formal complaint at an earlier opportunity. The resident’s email of 23 December 2020 where she made an obvious expression of dissatisfaction, and said she had felt the landlord had not followed “its own policies”. No response to this email was seen, and supports the resident’s sentiment that she was experiencing difficulty in raising and escalating complaints with the landlord.
  3.   The Ombudsman had to intervene and prompt the landlord for a formal response on 10 January 2021. When the Ombudsman relayed to the landlord that resident had said that she felt she was “forcefully evicted from her home”, and required a formal response, it took this sentiment literally, and its letter dated 8 February 2021 focussed solely on the move element of her complaint. The response was sent 31 working days after the resident’s email and 21 working days after the Ombudsman’s request, significantly outside of the timeframes expected within the landlord’s complaint policy for a stage one response. It was unreasonable that the landlord did not acknowledge or apologise for this.
  4.   The landlord failed to make direct contact with the resident to establish all that she was dissatisfied with, so that it could address all of her concerns fully in their stage one response. If it had, it could have established that she had felt “forcefully evicted” due to the mismanagement of her ASB case. As a result, its response was short, did not consider the crux of the issue, and lacked empathy and understanding of the resident’s situation.
  5.   The resident contacted the Ombudsman to advise she was dissatisfied with the stage one response, and following further prompting from this Service, a response from the landlord followed 23 working days later. There is no evidence that the landlord sought to understand what the resident remained dissatisfied with, nor did it evidence any discussions it had directly with the resident during this time.
  6.   The Housing Ombudsman’s Complaint Handling Code (CHC) makes clear that where the problem is a recurring issue, that the landlord consider older reports as part of the background of the complaint, if it will help to resolve the issue for the resident. There was no evidence that it did this. The stage two response again focussed solely on the move element of her request and made no comment to the handling of her ASB case, concluding that it had acted in accordance with its allocations policy. Its response lacked empathy and compassion towards the resident, and did not offer to follow up with the resident further to the SNP that was due to take place eight working days later.
  7.   In the handling of the resident’s complaint, the landlord failed to acknowledge where things had gone wrong, apologise or make any attempt to put things right for the resident. It took no accountability for its failures to fully address the resident’s concerns and by doing so was unable to demonstrate that it had learnt from outcomes.
  8.   Overall, there was maladministration of the landlord’s complaint handling. It failed to identify that the resident was dissatisfied with the handling of her ASB case, which resulted in a subsequent move from her home, and treated her dissatisfaction with the move itself in isolation. The landlord could not demonstrate that it discussed the complaint with the resident, and its responses lacked empathy to her situation, adding to her distress.

Determination (decision)

  1.   In accordance with paragraph 52 of the Housing Ombudsman Scheme there was severe maladministration in respect of the landlord’s response to the resident’s reports of anti-social behaviour (ASB) and subsequent request for a move.
  2.   In accordance with paragraph 52 of the Housing Ombudsman Scheme there was maladministration in respect of the landlord’s complaint handling.

Reasons

  1.   The resident’s reports of gang related activity were consistent throughout her interactions with the landlord. The allegations she had made that she felt unsafe in her home were serious, and required an urgent response in accordance with the landlord’s ASB policy. However the landlord could not demonstrate that it took ownership of her case, referring her continually back to the police whilst failing itself to identify the risks presented to her through a RAM or agree an effective action plan. There were failures within its partnership working, both with its own specialist teams and the police, causing delays and culminating in an inappropriate management move. The failures caused the resident significant distress over a prolonged period of approximately five years.
  2.   The landlord failed to apply the key principles of the CHC of “Be fair, Learn from Outcomes, Put matters right”. It failed to communicate directly with the resident at the earliest opportunity within its complaint process, and in doing so it considerably underestimated the amount of time she had been dissatisfied with its management of her ASB case. Both complaint responses seen were sent late, lacked empathy and failed to offer reassurance of what support could be offered to her following the date of the subsequent SNP.

Orders and recommendations

Orders

  1.   The Ombudsman orders the landlord’s chief executive to provide a written apology to the resident for the failures in the handling of this case, within four weeks.
  2.   The Ombudsman orders the landlord to pay directly to the resident a total of £11,300 in compensation within four weeks. The compensation compromises:
    1. £11,000 for the distress caused in the handling of the resident’s reports of ASB and subsequent move
    2. £300 for the distress and inconvenience caused to the resident by the failures found in the landlord’s complaint handling.
  3.   The landlord carry out a full senior management review of this case to identify learning and improve its working practices, within six weeks. The review must include:
    1. a full review of its training to staff on its ASB policy and procedure, with particular focus on the use of the RAM and action plans
    2. a full review of its training and information available to staff specifically around high priority ASB including hate crime and gangs, to ensure that staff are confident in dealing with reports of a similar nature in the future
    3. a review of its management oversight on ASB cases, with particular focus on recording actions, outcomes and case closure decisions
    4. a review of its process for approving ASB case reviews (formerly community trigger) requests
    5. a review of its process in referring to the SNP with consideration to implementing a quicker turnaround on hearings for urgent cases
    6. reviewing its collaboration and co-ordination between relevant teams when dealing with cases that span across different specialisms
    7. a review of its procedures in relation to resident’s vulnerabilities. In doing so, demonstrate how it will actively use its vulnerability information to provide any additional support that may be required
    8. a programme for training its staff on complaint handling, giving regards to the CHC.