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London & Quadrant Housing Trust (L&Q) (201914859)

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REPORT

COMPLAINT 201914859

London & Quadrant Housing Trust (L&Q)

30 April 2021

 

Our approach

The Housing Ombudsman’s approach to investigating and determining complaints is to decide what is fair in all the circumstances of the case. This is set out in the Housing Act 1996 and the Housing Ombudsman Scheme (the Scheme). The Ombudsman considers the evidence and looks to see if there has been any ‘maladministration’, for example whether the landlord has failed to keep to the law, followed proper procedure, followed good practice or behaved in a reasonable and competent manner.

Both the resident and the landlord have submitted information to the Ombudsman and this has been carefully considered. Their accounts of what has happened are summarised below. This report is not an exhaustive description of all the events that have occurred in relation to this case, but an outline of the key issues as a background to the investigation’s findings.

The complaint

  1. This complaint is about:
    1. The landlord’s handling of the resident’s concerns following a fire in his building.
    2. The landlord’s handling of the resident’s request to move.
    3. The landlord’s handling of, and response to, the findings of the building’s 2018 Fire Safety Assessment.

Background and summary of events

  1. The resident is a tenant of the landlord. He lives in a flat on the top floor of a converted terrace house. The house consists of three floors, with a flat on each floor.
  2. The landlord conducted a fire risk assessment (FRA) of the property on 14 November 2018. The assessment was comprehensive, and noted (amongst other things) that:
    1. “Residents and neighbours showed concern to the level of storage that is contained within Flat A on the ground floor (Flat A not accessed) under the control of a potentially vulnerable resident.” This was given a medium priority for the landlord to “address these concerns to ensure that any fire loading within individual flats are not placing other residents within the premises at risk.”
    2. “No fire detection in the common areas. Domestic smoke detection is present within residents flats.” This issue was given a high priority for the landlord to install a fire detection system in the property’s common areas, and heat and smoke detectors in the flats in the areas leading into the escape route “to protect the sleeping occupants”. It was given the reference HD1017895384.
    3. No timeframes for the above actions were noted in the FRA form.
    4. The FRA assessor noted that the top and ground floor flats were not accessed during the inspection, but the middle flat was.
  3. The landlord’s repair records show work jobs being raised in February 2019 to address some of the FRA’s recommendations. However, there is no evidence of work to install a fire detection system until 28 November 2019, when a work order was created to install temporary, battery powered fire alarms. These were to be removed once the permanent (mains powered) alarm system was installed. The records show a completion date for this work order of 13 April 2020. It is not apparent from the records whether, by the completion date, the system installed was mains powered or battery powered.
  4. A serious fire occurred in the ground floor flat of the property in the early hours of 18 December 2019. The fire brigade attended. No one was badly injured, but the flat’s tenant was taken to hospital and the flat was badly damaged. Communal areas were also affected by the fire. In a report later written in February 2020, one of the landlord’s officers (the property manager) explained that she attended the property on the day of the fire to check on the tenants and the damage. She explained that the resident was not home at the time, so she “tried to contact him later on in the day but he did not have good reception, he contacted me after 5pm but I was driving and unfortunately did not remember to contact him thereafter.” The officer noted that the middle flat tenant was present, and “was now trying to clean up the soot which was evident. I felt the stench was too unbearable and suggested that we find alternative accommodation for her.”
  5. In mid-January 2020 (specific date not recorded) the resident rang the landlord to complain about its handling of the fire aftermath. The landlord’s note of the call states that the resident said, “no one contacted me to see if I should of been temporary rehoused … the communal hallway is in the same condition since the fire”, he said he did not feel safe in the property, and had not been told the cause of the fire. The landlord returned the resident’s call. The resident clarified that the property manager who visited on 18 December 2019 had not returned his call at the time, and he had been left without information about what was happening about repairs to the communal areas, and whether he should be rehoused. He said that the occupant of the flat in which the fire occurred was vulnerable and unable to cope, and that he (the resident) did not feel safe in his home. The landlord noted that it would get an update on the repair works for the resident.
  6. An internal email dated 21 January 2020 notes that an inspection of the property had occurred that day. The inspection report focusses on the condition of the ground floor flat.
  7. The landlord spoke with the resident on 23 January 2020. He repeated his concerns about safety and wanting to move, which he said he had been trying to do since 2013 but “heard nothing” since. The landlord explained that it was assisting the occupant of the ground floor flat (in relation to the resident’s concerns about her vulnerability), and that it was waiting for a report from the fire brigade about the cause of the fire. The landlord said it would update the resident again in due course.
  8. In an internal email dated 24 January 2020 the landlord asked its tenancy team for information about the resident’s historic property transfer application (in 2013). It noted that the resident did not appear to have had any acknowledgement of his application, and asked for a letter to be sent to him.
  9. An internal email on 19 February 2020 asked whether the fire brigade report had been received, and noted that the resident was unhappy with the delay. It also asked for an update on repair work to the communal area, and whether smoke alarms had been fitted. The response, on 20 February, explained that the report had not yet been requested because the attending fire brigade station was not known, and the fire brigade website did not contain any details. The other occupants of the property also did not know which station had attended. There were smoke alarms in the communal hallway, but not immediately outside the resident’s flat, and it was not clear if the alarms were battery or mains electricity powered. This was planned to be checked when electrical testing was done (as part of the repairs).
  10. The landlord’s records show that the resident called for an update about the fire brigade report on 19 February 2020. The officer dealing with the case called him back and left a voice mail message.
  11. An internal email chain between 20 and 21 February 2020, in relation to the fire and the property, notes that as per the previous FRA “that a communal [fire detection] system will be installed under a “phased programme””, and that there was an open work order to install temporary, battery operated smoke detectors. The email explained that the contractors had had access difficulties, but that had been resolved, and they would attend the property the following week.
  12. One of the landlord’s officers spoke with the resident on 24 February 2020, following up on the calls made on 19 February. The resident said that he had not heard anything more about his property transfer request, and remained keen to move due to his safety concerns. The landlord said it would have one of its tenancy officers contact him about his transfer options, and explained that his concerns about the occupant of the ground floor flat were being considered, but that no details could be provided due to the personal nature of the matter. The resident asked for compensation for the distress and inconvenience he had been caused. The landlord said it would consider compensation once the repair works were complete.
  13. An internal email dated 24 February 2020 notes that the landlord was still waiting for the fire brigade report. It also notes that “I have an open complaint from the residents concerning the fire alarm system in the communal area. I have checked the FRA report and the following FRA HD1017895384 is a high priority for a fire detection system. Please can you update me on this FRA has this been completed?” It is not apparent which of the property tenants had complained about the fire alarm system. Another email on the same date shows the landlord asking the fire brigade for an incident report of the fire.
  14. An internal email dated 25 February 2020 asks whether the resident had been contacted and updated about repair works or given a “reassurance visit”. A second email asks whether a communal area smoke alarm could be installed by the resident’s flat, and states that the fire brigade would be chased for the incident report.
  15. The landlord sent its stage one complaint to the resident on 10 March 2020. It set out the timeline of events from the fire onwards. It acknowledged that its property manager had not called the resident back as promised, and apologised. It also acknowledged the resident’s concerns about his neighbour in the ground floor flat, and the risk of future fires. It explained it could not give specific details, but said that it was working with the neighbour and would involve other organisations if necessary to provide support for her. It acknowledged that it could not guarantee there would be no further incidents, but hoped that the additional support would help keep the neighbour safe (and therefore also the other tenants).
  16. The landlord confirmed that it had now received the fire brigade report, and explained that it had inspected the property to identify the necessary repairs, which would include smoke damage to communal areas. It said it would keep the resident updated about repair timescales. The landlord acknowledged the resident’s request to move, and confirmed that he had had an active application since 2013, which allowed him to bid on properties to move to. It explained that the transfer process was “resident driven and relies on you actively seeking a move by registering with appropriate sites and agencies, searching for properties, bidding, and attending viewings where applicable.” It explained how he could improve his chances of success, and said he should have now received a letter from its lettings team about his moving options.
  17. The landlord accepted that its standard of service had been lower than it should have been, that there had been poor management of the resident’s enquiries, and that he should have been contacted after the fire. It apologised, explained the ways in which it had attempted to learn from the complaint, and offered the resident £50 for its “lapses in customer service and communication.” It explained that it could not say how long the communal repairs would take, but said it had asked them to be prioritised. It explained that he could make contact if he had any further concerns or comments, and that if it did not hear from him within two weeks it would consider the matter closed.
  18. The resident wrote to the landlord on 13 March 2020. He repeated his dissatisfaction with not being called in December after the fire, and explained he was “very upset I didn’t get a follow up call regarding temporary accommodation which I did need. So please note over the Christmas period I had to stay in a smoke & dust filled flat with that horrendous smell”. He said he had had no updates about the repair work, and that he had been able to contact the fire brigade himself about the report “and got a reply within an hour that same afternoon … with a link to the fire report.” He also reiterated that he feared for his life in the property, as there had been a range of incidents with the occupant of the ground floor flat over the years, and the fire was “the last straw”. He explained it had had a traumatic effect on him, and did not feel that the landlord was taking the matter seriously. He also felt its compensation offer was too low.
  19. The landlord responded to the resident on 18 March 2020. It acknowledged his concerns and empathised with his situation. It explained that the ground floor occupant was not currently living at the property, and repeated its hope that the support she would receive would avert any future accidents. It explained that it felt the £50 it had offered was appropriate, but asked the resident to clarify what outcome he was seeking.
  20. One of the landlord’s officers visited the resident, apparently on 18 March 2020 (the landlord’s record is an extract from a different set of records and the date may not be accurate). The landlord noted that the resident alleged the occupant of the ground floor flat was storing large numbers of belongings in communal areas, and had not alerted other tenants when the fire occurred. He repeated his wish to move, and the landlord explained he would not be eligible for a management transfer. The resident explained that his daughter no longer lived with him, and so his two-bedroom flat was under occupied. The landlord said that he may therefore be able to register to move on that basis and asked him to confirm his situation in writing.
  21. The resident told the landlord on 19 March 2020 that he wated to escalate his complaint as he remained dissatisfied with the outcome so far, and with his situation.
  22. An internal email 23 March 2020 states that the landlord had “chased up our payments department as they have not sent off the cheque for the fire report as yet” (this appears to contradict the landlord’s explanation in its complaint response that it had received the fire brigade report).
  23. The landlord sent a follow up complaint response on 25 March 2020. It reiterated and expanded on its original explanations and comments. It explained that the fire could not have been predicted, but it was taking measures to avoid a repeat, such as involving external organisations to help support the ground floor tenant. It repeated its explanation that the resident needed to actively seek a transfer using the various options open to him, and provided contact details for its departments which could assist him with that. It acknowledged the discussion its officer had had with the resident about down-sizing from two bedrooms to one, and said it would contact him about that separately. It repeated its apologies for the poor service it had provided in managing the resident’s enquiries, and in not following up with him in December 2019. It explained that “Any L&Q review of compensation takes into consideration whether you experienced adversity because of the issues you experienced.” It said it had increased its compensation to £70.
  24. The landlord explained that it had incorrectly said in its stage one response that it had received the fire brigade report on the fire. What it had actually received was the fire brigade attendance confirmation, and the full report was still to come. It said, however, that the report would relate to the ground floor flat, and would not be able to be released. It explained that the resident’s escalation request had been considered by managers, but it was felt that an escalation would not change the outcome, and the resident had therefore completed the landlord’s complaint process. It explained that the resident could bring his complaint to this Service if he remained dissatisfied.

Assessment and findings

The landlord’s handling of the resident’s concerns following a fire in his building

  1. There is no dispute that the landlord failed to follow up on its check on the resident on the afternoon after the fire. On the face of it, that was a simple mistake, and the landlord acknowledged and apologised for it. However, in this case, the consequence was that there was no check on the resident’s personal health and wellbeing, and no apparent consideration of the condition of his flat following the fire. Without these checks the landlord had no way to know whether the resident should be offered temporary accommodation while the building was cleaned and repaired.
  2. In the absence of the promised call back from the landlord’s officer on 18 December 2019, it presumably would have been possible for the resident to make contact again. It is not apparent why that did not happen. Nonetheless, if this was an important factor it should have been raised by the landlord as part of its complaint investigation.
  3. In both his original and escalation complaints, the resident specifically referred to his dissatisfaction with the poor state of the building after the fire, and referred to nobody discussing with him the possibility of temporary accommodation. While the landlord acknowledged the failure to call the resident back on or after 18 December 2019, it did not go on to consider the consequences of that failure. We cannot now say what the resident might have done if he had had such an offer. The indications are that he would likely have accepted it, and, at the very least, he should have been given the opportunity to explain how he had been impacted by the fire, and allow the landlord to make an informed decision about temporary accommodation.
  4. Both the landlord’s officer and the resident referred to the presence of smoke, soot, and/or dust in the property following the fire, and that the smell was an “unbearable stench” or “horrendous”. So there can be no doubt that the property was in a very poor and uncomfortable state after the fire. In the circumstances then, the landlord had the opportunity in its complaint investigations to realise its serious oversight and seek to remedy it. It failed to do so. That omission, and the loss of opportunity to the resident to avoid the poor condition of his home and surroundings over that period, was significant enough to be considered maladministration.

Handling of the resident’s request to move

  1. The landlord operates a choice based letting scheme, which allows tenants to bid for properties when they want to move. Such schemes are designed for the tenant themselves to initiate and pursue their search for properties, and to bid on any they find which they are interested in.
  2. The resident told the landlord that he had applied for rehousing in 2013. The landlord confirmed that he was registered. It could not confirm that he had been sent the relevant information about the scheme. However, given the amount of time that had passed, it does not seem unusual that such evidence could not be identified. The information it subsequently gave the resident about his rehousing options was accurate, and in line with the landlord’s rehousing options.
  3. In conjunction with the resident, the landlord identified that his home was now too large for his needs, and explained how that could improve his options when seeking a new home. It offered the resident support and assistance with this, but it correctly emphasised that it would be for him to drive his search.
  4. Overall, in the period considered in this investigation, the landlord had responded reasonably to the resident’s queries and requests about rehousing. The information it provided was in line with the rehousing scheme, and appropriate to the resident’s circumstances.

The landlord’s handling of, and response to, the findings of the building’s 2018 Fire Safety Assessment.

  1. The landlord’s fire safety policy states that:
    1. “Every effort will be made on each inspection to gain access to 10% of flats (or a minimum of two in properties containing less than 10 flats, or one door in properties containing less than three flats) to check the adequacy of the flat front entrance door, means of escape and smoke detection provided. The FRA team shall adopt a suitable strategy to help ensure that access is made including, where appropriate, the booking of appointments…Where insufficient numbers of properties are accessed to satisfy the above requirements the FRA team shall raise an action to the appropriate persons to arrange access so that the above is achieved.
    2. The fire risk assessor shall determine the risk associated with each significant finding (High, Medium or Low) and will assign an action with a suitable timescale for remediation. A suitable timescale should take into account the requirement for procurement, tendering and the time required on site to complete the works as well as the administration time for organising. Timescales for the most commonly raised actions will be determined between the FRA team and the relevant action owners and will be reviewed regularly by the FRA team.
    3. FRA’s will also be reviewed as a result of unplanned events such as: Any fire within (or impacting on) areas under the scope of the FRA.”
  2. The November 2018 FRA highlighted as a high priority the lack of fire detection systems in the communal areas of the property. The FRA form includes a risk rating matrix, which categorises a high risk item as something where “Effort is required to reduce the risk… If occupied, urgent action should be taken to reduce the risk.” Despite the landlord’s fire management policy calling for the Fire Risk Assessor to provide a timeframe for any remedial actions, there are no timeframes or deadlines in the FRA. It is possible that such timeframes would be decided or documented separately, but no such evidence has been seen.
  3. The landlord’s repair records do not show any clear action on the fire detection system until a work job was raised one year after the FRA, in November 2019, despite the issue being given an FRA “urgent” and “high” risk rating. The landlord’s internal correspondence following the resident’s complaint refers to the issue both generally, and specifically (in relation to the FRA action number). The correspondence indicates confusion about whether the work had been done, and the nature of it i.e. temporary or permanent. The internal emails on 20 and 21 February 2020 contradictingly state both that smoke detectors had been installed, and also that they would be installed the following week. Accordingly, it appears that the work to install the fire detection system, ordered in the FRA in November 2018, was not actually started until sometime in February 2020. The repair records show a completion date in April 2020, nearly 17 months after the FRA raised the issue. That period of time was exceedingly long, and wholly unreasonable given the serious nature of the problem and the importance given to it in the FRA.
  4. Of the three flats in the property, only one was accessed during the FRA inspection. This is despite landlord’s fire safety policy requiring that at least two flats are accessed in properties containing less than 10 flats, and the concern raised to the Fire Risk Assessor by another tenant of the potential fire risk in the ground floor flat. No evidence has been provided of further action in this regard, even though the policy requires that “the FRA team shall raise an action to the appropriate persons to arrange access so that the above is achieved.” This was not appropriate.
  5. In addition, the fire safety policy requires that a new FRA will be commissioned in a range of circumstances, including a fire but no evidence has been provided of any new FRA being completed by the landlord in the property after the fire in December 2019.
  6. For the above reasons, the landlord’s overall handling of the communal area fire safety, and its apparent failure to implement several aspects of its fire safety policy, were serious enough to be considered maladministration.

Determination (decision)

  1. In accordance with paragraph 54 of the Housing Ombudsman Scheme, there was maladministration in the landlord’s:
    1. handling of the resident’s concerns following a fire in his building.
    2. handling of, and response to, the findings of the building’s 2018 Fire Safety Assessment.
  2. In accordance with paragraph 54 of the Scheme, there was no maladministration in the landlord’s handling of the resident’s request to move.

Orders and recommendations

  1. In light of the maladministration found in this investigation, the landlord is ordered to, within four weeks of the date of this report, pay the resident compensation totalling £750 that comprises:
    1. £500 for its handling of the resident’s concerns following the fire.
    2. £250 for its overall fire risk management of the property.
  2. The scale of these compensation orders is in recognition of:
    1. the lost opportunity to the resident of avoiding living in the odorous, dusty, and sooty conditions in the building over the Christmas period, and the failure to identify this during the landlord’s investigation of the complaint (which would possibly have avoided the need for the Ombudsman’s involvement); and
    2. the failure to follow multiple FRA processes and the unreasonable time taken to implement the FRA high risk action for fire detection systems.
  3. The landlord is also ordered to consider the failings highlighted in this investigation, specifically in relation to the FRA, and create an action plan to address whichever procedural flaws allowed the failings to occur. The landlord is to provide a copy of the resulting action plan to this Service within 6 weeks of the date of this report.

Recommendation

  1. The landlord’s complaints policy states that when an escalation request is received, “the person handling the complaint will review it with their manager.”
  2. In this case the same officer responded to the resident’s stage one complaint, and also to his escalation request. In the response to the escalation request the officer explained that he had discussed the case with his manager. This was in line with the landlord’s complaints policy.
  3. However, the Ombudsman’s Complaint Handling Code calls for a complaint to be investigated impartially. The consequence of the landlord’s complaints policy is that the same officer issues both the original complaint response, and any subsequent refusal to escalate the complaint. This gives the appearance of lacking impartiality, even though, as in this case, the decision not to escalate was made in consultation with the officer’s manager.
  4. The landlord is recommended to consider this aspect of its complaints policy and procedure, with a view to removing any potential doubt about the impartiality of its complaint escalation decisions.