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Clarion Housing Association Limited (202015858)

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REPORT

COMPLAINT 202015858

Clarion Housing Association Limited

27 June 2023

 

Our approach

The Housing Ombudsman’s approach to investigating and determining complaints is to decide what is fair in all the circumstances of the case. This is set out in the Housing Act 1996 and the Housing Ombudsman Scheme (the Scheme). The Ombudsman considers the evidence and looks to see if there has been any ‘maladministration’, for example whether the landlord has failed to keep to the law, followed proper procedure, followed good practice or behaved in a reasonable and competent manner.

Both the resident and the landlord have submitted information to the Ombudsman and this has been carefully considered. Their accounts of what has happened are summarised below. This report is not an exhaustive description of all the events that have occurred in relation to this case, but an outline of the key issues as a background to the investigation’s findings.

The complaint

  1. The resident’s complaint was about:
    1. The landlord’s response to the resident’s request for a “EWS1” and her concerns about fire safety.
    2. The landlord’s level of communication.
    3. The landlord’s response to the resident’s request to buy back the property.
    4. The Ombudsman has investigated the landlord’s complaint handling.

Background and summary of events

  1. The resident occupied a second-floor flat in a block together with her children under a shared ownership lease dated 31 July 2019, which she owned jointly with her husband. The block in which the resident’s property was situated was five stories and less than 18 metres in height.

Legal and policy framework

  1. The landlord’s fire safety policy stated as follows:
    1. The Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 imposes a number of legal duties upon the landlord. The Regulations clarifies the approach to be taken in relation to fire safety with an onus on risk assessment and managing risks rather than blanket fire precaution.
    2. The landlord was committed to taking all reasonable steps to protect its staff members, residents, visitors, guests, and contractors and those in the vicinity of its premises from the effects of fire.
    3. The duties included to carry out, review and take action regarding Fire Risk Assessments on a regular basis. It was therefore the role of the landlord, to proactively seek evidenced assurances that all legislation relating to fire was being complied with, that the risks associated with fire were identified and managed, and that a proper controls and an assurance framework were in place.
    4. Some blocks with complex design types represented a greater risk due to the extent of communal spaces to manage and the number of individuals who could potentially be impacted by a major fire. This category included high rise block defined as six stories or above.

The legislation

  1. The Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 was not applicable to domestic premises but it did apply to the common areas of blocks of flats. On 19 March 2020, the Government introduced a Fire Safety Bill, which was to amend the Fire Safety Order to clarify that the responsible person for multi-occupied, residential buildings must manage and reduce the risk of fire for the structure and external walls of the building, including cladding, balconies, and windows.
  2. The Building Regulations 2010 were amended in 2019 to include that the external envelope of a building should not contribute to undue fire spread from one part of a building to another.
  3. In January 2020, the government issued guidance that stated that “for the avoidance of doubt, building owners should follow the steps in this advice as soon as possible to ensure the safety of residents and not await further advice or information to act”. Part of the advice regarding cladding was as follows: “If not undertaken recently, building owners should consider an immediate audit or review of the buildings for which they are responsible to identify their height, construction, location and wind exposure. It is likely that you will need to seek expert advice from a suitably qualified person such as a Chartered Structural Engineer or Chartered Building Surveyor”. It added that “The need to assess and manage the risk of external fire spread applies to buildings of any height.”
  4. The advice was withdrawn in January 2022, according to Gov.uk [Withdrawn] Building safety advice for building owners, including fire doors – GOV.UK (www.gov.uk) for the following reasons: “The Consolidated Advice Note has been wrongly interpreted and has driven a cautious approach to building safety that goes beyond what we consider necessary. The Consolidated Advice Note is therefore being withdrawn to ensure that it is not used to justify disproportionate assessments.”

The EWS1

  1. A brief history of the EWS1 is as follows:
    1. The EWS1 form was introduced for buildings over 18 metres high in December 2019, following the Grenfell fire and government advice regarding building safety. The Royal Institute of Chartered Surveyors (RICS) devised the EWS1 for the purpose of providing confirmation to valuers and lenders that an external wall system or attachments on buildings containing flats had been assessed by a suitable expert. Following the January 2020 government advice, mortgage lenders began to require an ESW1 for buildings under 18 metres high.
    2. In July 2021, the government issued a statement stating that EWS1 forms were not needed for buildings below 18 metres.
    3. The government withdrew the January 2020 advice note altogether on 22 January 2022.
    4. It meant that there was no statutory or automatic obligation for landlords to carry out an EWS1 assessment or provide copies of EWS1 forms to leaseholders.
    5. In the words of the form, the EWS1 form was for the external wall system only. It was not a fire safety certificate.
    6. The form had two assessment criteria, A and B. Option “A” constituted a pass. Option “B” applied to properties where there were “combustible materials present in the external wall”. Option A required the signatory to have the expertise to identify the relevant materials within the external wall and attachments and whether fire resisting cavity barriers and fire stopping measures have been installed correctly. Option B required that the assessor had specific qualifications in relation to fire safety. The assessment would be rated as B1, which was a pass, where, in the view of the assessor, the fire risk was sufficiently low that no remedial works were required, or B2, essentially a fail, where the fire risk was sufficiently high that remedial works were required and that the assessor had identified the remedial and interim measures required, which would be referred to in the assessor’s report.

Chronology

  1. A fire assessment of the resident’s block took place on 16 January 2020, with a review date of 15 January 2023. It noted as follows:
    1. “The decks to balconies were of timber construction. Consideration should be given to ensuring timber has been subject to suitable fire retarding processes/treatment by 23 January 2022.
    2. Further investigation and resultant works were to be undertaken to ensure adequate standards of compartmentation/separation exists. Cladding could be of a type which could present a risk. Accordingly, it recommended the following:
      1. Conduct a desktop review of the products installed ensuring that cladding and core of any sandwich panels used was a fire rated type.
      2. Review the competency of the individuals that installed and fire-stopped the external façade.
      3. Where doubt exists as to the validity of the desktop findings, it recommended a ‘type 4 survey’ was undertaken to ascertain the installation and fire stopping quality and any findings acted on with a high priority,
      4. Where doubts existed or cladding was found to be of a combustible type advice and guidance is available in Annex A of DCLG safety checks following Grenfell fire”.
    3. The overall risk rating was “tolerable” with a medium reassessment priority. Even after works, the risk would be reduced to “tolerable”.
  2. The landlord provided this Service with its notes of telephone calls and emails from March 2020. They related to issues of initial defects and disrepair but there was no reference to fire safety.
  3. On 12 February 2021, the resident wrote to the landlord that she had learnt that the building did not have an ESW1 certificate and that the cladding on the flat was combustible. She queried why, if that was the case, she had been able to buy her flat.
  4. She wrote again on 24 February 2021 and referred to having made a complaint on 12 February 2021. The reports of the handover had been “lost” when the landlord purchased the building. She was of the view that she was not “sold the flat legally”. She was unable to sell her property or remortgage. She did not feel safe with the knowledge that the cladding on her building was combustible. She did not have faith that this was going to be resolved swiftly, given the issues she had had with her windows. She wanted the landlord to accept responsibility and return her deposit, rent, mortgage costs, and service charges. She wanted compensation as she would have lost her first buyer discount.
  5. The landlord wrote on 25 February 2021 stating her complaint had been logged as a complaint.
  6. The resident wrote again on 19 March 2021. She was still no further forward of any resolution as to the problems that she had raise complaints about. She would like the landlord to buy her out given all the disrepair issues. She reported she was mentally ill and had suicidal thoughts.
  7. The landlord wrote on 25 March 2021 as follows:
    1. It had instructed an external wall system (EWS1) inspection to be completed by its specified contractor. It was seeking to provide an EWS1 as soon as possible.
    2. It explained what a EWS1 was.
    3. It was having difficulties with identifying a copper panel on the outside of the building.
    4. It was fully aware of the implications of an EWS1 inspection and the possibility of works being required. Where works were identified, the landlord would explore all available options before looking to leaseholders for costs. It would update the resident when it had the information.
    5. The building had been built in line with the guidelines at the time of construction.
    6. There had been no findings to date to suggest the building was not safe to be inhabited.
    7. It would notify residents if any fire measures were required.
    8. It offered £25 compensation, in recognition of the delay in providing a response.
  8. The resident replied on 25 March 2021 asking to escalate her complaint. An intrusive survey had already taken place. It was concerning that the landlord was not aware and that it was unable to identify what the copper panel consisted of. Her corner flat had three sides with the cooper panel. She felt unsafe. She felt unsafe that the landlord was unable to locate paperwork. She asked why the landlord had not been in touch the managing agents. A specific surveyor had informed her that there were reports and paperwork missing from when the landlord bought the block. The fire engineer consultant had carried out the intrusive survey on other buildings therefore she was aware that the cladding needed replacing. She was awaiting a call back. The compensation offered was “pitiful” given she had spent hours on the phone and emailing. Her daughter did not feel safe and wanted to move away. Her husband and she were discussing separation due to the stress.
  9. The landlord escalated the complaint on 29 March 2021 and said it would respond within 20 working days.
  10. The landlord noted internally on 30 March 2021 that the “buyback” policy did not apply in her case. The buyback policy applied to shared owners in financial difficulties to help them avoid repossession and remain in their home and was limited in any event. The resident could explore subletting and this has been highlighted as an option to them.
  11. On 31 March 2021, an EWS1 was issued by a member of the Institution of Fire Engineers as a fail in that it was judged that remedial works were required. The building did not comply with the Government’s January 2020 advice. It recommended that an annual fire risk assessment was undertaken for the properties. The attending report by the consultant engineer entitled “façade review” dated 31 March 2021 stated as follows:
    1. The inspection had taken place on 23 March 2021 to provide a review in line with Government January 2020 guidance. The building did not comply with that guidance.
    2. The external wall systems that were present had a detrimental impact on the overall fire safety of the building.
    3. It set out the material of the cladding and the factors that meant that remedial action was required and that the system, as well as the balcony timber, be replaced with different materials.
    4. It also set out areas where no remedial action was required.
    5. It recommended yearly fire risk assessments.
    6. It recommended interim measures regarding the external fabric but the risk was at a level so that there was no requirement for any interim measures, such as a waking watch, to be implemented.
  12. According to the landlord’s records, the parties had a telephone conversation on 1 April 2020 regarding her complaint. The content is set out in the parties’ subsequent emails.
  13. The resident wrote on the same day that it had been 20 minutes since her telephone conversation with the landlord and she had not yet received an email clarifying what she had spoken about on the telephone. The status of the complaint had now evolved as her block had been given a “B-2” rating. This meant that there was combustible material within the cladding which would need remedial work as it was unsafe. While the landlord had stated that there were no issues when the landlord brought the building, its surveyor had stated that documentation was missing. She cited that many residents had reports of damp and mould as evidence that the building was defective. She was particularly worried about the fire risk in the light of neighbours throwing cigarette butts over the balcony and smoking drugs. She referred to her complaints about the condition of the property.
  14. The landlord replied on the same day to confirm the parties’ telephone conversation as follows:
    1. The resident stated that she had that day received confirmation that her building has been rated a “B2” following recent inspection, meaning that its required remedial work to comply with “fire regulations”.
    2. She advised that her complaint had now become that her building has been deemed unsafe and would like to know what actions the landlord would be taking to make the building safe.
    3. She and her family felt unsafe in the building and she was unable to sell or remortgage her property due to the safety issues.
    4. She wanted the landlord to acknowledge that the building was only added to the list for an intrusive inspection because she pushed for this.
    5. The landlord stated that the issues would be addressed in its second stage complaint.
  15. The resident replied also on the same day that the email did not reflect what she had said. Her concerns about the ESW1, or the fact that survey needed doing on her building had not been taken seriously. When she had raised the issues, her block was excluded from government legislation which related to buildings of 18 metres. She said the landlord had misquoted her. Her complaint had always been foremost the fact that the occupiers were not safe in the building. The remedial work would cause disruption, noise, and an intrusion of privacy. It would affect her husband who worked nightshifts. She wanted a decant during the works. The ideal outcome would be to be bought out.
  16. On 16 April 2021, the landlord wrote as follows with its Stage 2 final response to the complaint as follows:
    1. It considered that its Stage 1 response had appropriately addressed the concerns she had about the EWS1 certificate and cladding.
    2. An assessment was completed on 31 March 2021 and the ESW1 form was returned with a “B2” categorisation. This meant that the “adequate standard of safety (had) not been achieved”. It noted that the building was deemed to be compliant with Building Regulations at the time of construction and signed off by Building Control. However, as part of its Building Safety Programme, the Government has issued guidance to landlords asking them to check their properties. It was still carrying out investigations in line with the most recent government advice which was issued after the building had been purchased.
    3. Whilst it was not a statutory requirement to provide an EWS1 certificate, the change in Government guidance put significant pressure to provide this information. The landlord, alongside many other landlords, had found that there were only a handful of consultancies able to complete these new assessments, mainly due to the exacting qualifications required and difficulties of surveyors securing professional indemnity insurance. It was working on a programme to undertake assessments of all of its multi-occupancy buildings and it had potentially over 8,000 buildings that needed to be checked. It was not the case that her building was not going to be included in the survey.
    4. It had acted as quickly as possible in securing the EWS1 certificate. There had been challenges which caused delays in getting the final results.
    5. It needed to determine the next steps to be undertaken. It was likely that it would need to perform further intrusive inspections and then potentially discuss the findings with the original builder if there were issues that related to them. At that present time, it was unable to confirm when any remedial repairs would be undertaken.
    6. It would update residents by the end of May 2021 at the earliest.
    7. Its policies did not allow the landlord to buy back the property despite the difficulties being caused by the current circumstances.
    8. It was aware of the current impacts being caused and would do what it could to help alleviate any inconvenience whilst adhering to its own policies. It believed that subletting was an alternative solution if she was experiencing problems selling the property. If she was looking to relocate, it could explore providing consent to sublet whilst the EWS1 issue was being resolved.
    9. The complaint handler had offered the resident £25 for the time taken to respond to the Stage 1 formal complaint.
    10. It did not find service failure in its handling of the EWS1 and building safety concerns.
  17. The landlord wrote on 4 June 2021 to a fire safety investigator with an instruction to undertake an intrusive inspection. Its concerns were the use of “unknown” cladding materials, the presence/adequacy of cavity barriers, and the extent of the timber balconies which might require some remediation.
  18. The investigator replied on 25 June 2021.
    1. He had been “swamped as ever”.
    2. He had reviewed the documents. He identified issues in relation to the car park and made recommendations.
    3. He would provide a proposal.
  19. According to an exchange of emails of 28 June 2021, an alarm contractor attended site that day to assess the site.
  20. On 7 July 2021, the landlord wrote a letter to shared owners as follows:
    1. It referred to government revised guidance on building safety standards regarding external walls and cladding and explained what was a EWS1.
    2. An EWS1 assessment had been requested the previous year and the assessment was that it did not achieve an adequate standard of safety.
    3. At that stage, it was unable to confirm the extent or timescale for undertaking these potential works.
    4. More recently, it had arranged for a further fire engineer review of the building as part of its ongoing checks of cladded blocks. The engineer has advised that it should temporarily change the existing fire strategy from “stay put” to “simultaneous evacuation”.
    5. The reason was that combustible materials had been identified in the external wall system and the timber decking was not a material with limited combustibility.
    6. To achieve the simultaneous evacuation policy, it was arranging for the installation of a wireless fire and smoke detection system at no cost to the residents and explained how it would work. It would contact the residents with more information about what to do should the alarms sounded. The works would be carried out at the end of July 2021.
    7. It was undertaking a nationwide review of all buildings.
    8. Once the review had been completed, it would determine a timeframe for any further intrusive inspections and/or remedial works.
    9. It was unable to provide exact dates but would update the residents.
    10. The Fire Brigade had been updated.
    11. It provided means of contact for further information.
  21. The landlord wrote to all the residents in the block as follows on 21 March 2022:
    1. A review of the building by a fire engineer, as part of its on-going checks of cladded blocks, advised a temporary change to the existing fire strategy from ‘stay put’ to ‘simultaneous evacuation’.
    2. To achieve the simultaneous evacuation policy a wireless fire and smoke detection system was installed at no cost to residents.
    3. It apologised that this matter had taken some time to move forward, however an engineer had been appointed to act as “Expert Witness”. He would provide an opinion as to whether the defects with the external wall system that, in his opinion, were the liability of the original builder.
    4. It would then consider its next steps to ensure that the building met the current fire safety guidance.
    5. It would advise on the outcome of the review and the action that the landlord would be taking. It provided a means of contact.
  22. The resident made a further, related complaint. The landlord replied as follows:
    1. The complaint was about the “landlord’s failure” to supply a EWS1 report.
    2. A request for details of when the landlord was first made aware of the changes in the law in regard to cladding.
    3. It set out some history. Development of the block was completed in May 2018, She purchased the property on 31 July 2019. At the time of handover, the building was deemed compliant with Building Regulations and signed off by Building Control. The Government had been releasing advice notes regarding cladding under its Building Safety Programme since its inception, shortly after the Grenfell tragedy in 2017 across a three-year period, by way of twenty three advice notes. In January 2020, the Government revised its advice and produced a Consolidated Advice Note. It initially focussed on high rise buildings, namely buildings over 18 metres. It had always been an option for lenders to request an EWS1. The consolidated advice in January 2020 focussed lenders onto lower storey blocks.
    4. The EWS1 process required a fire safety assessment to be conducted by a suitably qualified, competent professional and are requested at the discretion of the lender.
    5. A landlord assisted homeowners by instructing EWS1 surveys when required by lenders. The EWS1 was obtained at a request from another leaseholder.
    6. As a result, it had installed additional heat detection in the flats and moved to a simultaneous evacuation policy.
    7. It had taken time but it had instructed an expert engineer to advise whether there were defects with the external wall system that were the liability of the original builder or not.
    8. It would then consider what action it would take to ensure that the building met the current fire safety guidance.
    9. It did not provide the technical report. The engineer’s assessment, with an intrusive inspection, would be the advice which would inform its decisions.
    10. It was committed to ensure that any remedial work required was delivered as soon as possible.
    11. It did not uphold the complaint.
  23. On 17 May 2022, the landlord wrote to the resident that the work by the expert engineer would commence on 8 June 2022 with intrusive investigations taking place the following month. It was still unable to provide a timescale. It explained the position on costs that leaseholders would be unlikely to have to pay in any event.
  24. The landlord informed this Service on 9 June 2023 that the resident sold the property on 23 January 2023.
  25. The resident informed this service that she received the report of 31 March 2021 during the course of her sale and reported that she had lost money in the sale.

Assessment and findings

The landlord’s response to the resident’s request for a EWS1 and her concerns about fire safety.

  1. The resident referred to the effects on her mental health. The evidence showed that the issue caused her a great deal of worry and concern. However, it is not within the Ombudsman’s expertise to investigate whether, or how, a landlord’s actions have impacted on a resident’s mental health. Nevertheless, the Ombudsman can consider any distress a resident has experienced.
  2. While this was not the subject of the complaint, there was no evidence that the landlord addressed the resident reports of her mental health, her suicidal thoughts, and her reports of anti-social behaviour (ASB). The Ombudsman would have expected the landlord to have followed up these matters with offers of support, some signposting, potentially some safeguarding concerns and further information about the reported ASB.
  3. There was no evidence that the building had not passed building control and the Ombudsman accepts that was the case. Therefore, the Ombudsman does not attribute fault, based on the evidence before it, to the landlord for selling the property to the resident or the disruption the works would cause. However, if there were issues of misrepresentation or latent defects, this would be a matter in relation to which the resident would need to seek advice, as they concern issues of legal negligence that are outside the Ombudsman’s remit.
  4. There was no evidence, and the Ombudsman would not have expected the landlord to have been aware whether there was an issue with the cladding, when it sold the property to the resident in 2019. The concerns centred on buildings 18 metres and higher. It is for the buyer, or buyer’s solicitor on the buyer’s behalf, to make proper enquiries as to the condition of the property. A question about fire safety is now (since January 2023), a standard question in enquiries to the seller. Her lender would have been satisfied with the issue at that time.
  5. The landlord appropriately complied with its duty to obtain a fire risk assessment. The assessment highlighted a potential risk in relation to the timber balconies and advised that they should be investigated by January 2022. It provided advice in January 2020 to investigate the cladding and the focus was on taking precautions in case of fire. However, it did not highlight any particular risk. The government advice extended to buildings under 18 metres also in January 2020. Therefore, it was not unreasonable that the landlord should begin to consider the risks in January 2020 onwards.
  6. It was reasonable of the landlord to secure an EWS1, given that there is no obligation on the landlord to obtain one. While the resident may have been concerned about a future sale, there was no indication she had informed the landlord that she was putting her property on the market at the time, though she clearly intended to sell at a later date.
  7. A major point of the resident’s complaint was her concern for her and her family’s safety. While there was no obligation, statutory or otherwise, to obtain a ESW1, the landlord had obligations and its own policies made assurances about fire safety including that it was committed to protect occupants from the effects of fire and that “all risks were identified”. The fundamental point was the fire safety of the building and that was the point the resident insisted upon.
  8. The landlord is referred to the Housing Ombudsman’s Spotlight report on Cladding. Housing Ombudsman Spotlight report on cladding (housing-ombudsman.org.uk) .The report points out that most landlords took a risk-based approach and prioritised their buildings, taking into accountbuilding height, occupancy and known building materials. That is understandable, including from a costs point of view. At the time of the complaint, residents could have been responsible for those costs. It is appreciated that landlordshave to take sensible decisions and weigh up a number of complex factors. It is noteworthy that the Government withdrew its advice in relation to buildings below 18 metres in July 2021 and its advice altogether in January 2022.
  9. The landlord was advised to consider carrying out an assessment, regardless of building height, in, or certainly by, January 2020 when the government published its advice. However, this advice was guidance only. The evidence showed that the landlord was prompted to pursue an EWS1 following a request by a resident, presumably for the purposes of a sale. While that demonstrated the landlord’s wish to be helpful, the Ombudsman is concerned that it was a resident’s request and not the fire risk assessment or the guidance that prompted the inspection.
  10. The landlord did not explain why it did not consider an inspection in any event, given the heightened concerns raised by the Grenfell fire in June 2017, once the fire risk assessment and guidance were published in January 2020. However, it did state that there was shortage of suitably qualified experts while the Government guidance increased demand. The demand was partly evidenced by the fire investigator being “swamped”. The Ombudsman is aware that this was an issue across the housing sector. The Ombudsman also notes that the landlord was to review a significant number of properties. There would have been a number of other factors, such as the pandemic, the complexity of the issues, and a shortage of fire experts, given the demand that would have contributed to the delays. It is also noted that the block was not “high-rise”, by its own policy definition and that there were specific issues with the materials used in the exterior walls of the building.
  11. Taking all of the circumstances into account, there would have been a delay before securing a report in any event. Therefore, the Ombudsman does not consider the delay of 15 months following the 2020 advice unreasonable.
  12. Once the EWS1 was in place, the evidence showed that the landlord considered interim measures, pending further investigations and works. It reassured the residents that it would not be passing on costs, which, after the passing of the Building Safety Act 2022 in April 2022, it would have limited ability to do, in any event. The landlord set out the next steps and explained it was unable to provide a timescales, which was realistic. It reasonably provided a means of contact and reassurance that it was in contact with the Fire Brigade.
  13. While there would be disruption during any remedial works, there was no evidence that the landlord could have foreseen that the works would be required. The works would be necessary to ensure the safety of the occupiers. It would be open to the resident to request a decant at the time when the extent of the works was known.
  14. The Ombudsman has concluded that while there was some delay in the landlord obtaining a EWS1 and investigating the building safety, the delay was not unreasonable and the Ombudsman finds no maladministration in that regard.

The landlord’s level of communication

  1. While the Ombudsman does not find the landlord acted unreasonably in relation to its investigations, that does not take into consideration the resident’s experience. Given the understandable anxiety created by the Grenfell fire, the difficulties that leaseholders experienced in selling their properties and concerns about service charges, the Ombudsman would expect the landlord to ensure that there were regular updates to leaseholders and to be very clear from the outset in relation to the issues of fire safety and the level of risk. The importance of clear communication could not be stressed sufficiently. It is the Ombudsman’s view that the landlord needs to be highly proactive in this area and to provide clear communication to all its residents.
  2. While the landlord was realistic and clear in its explanation why it could not provide timescales, there was little evidence of proactive updates by the landlord. The only evidence consisted of the letters of July 2021 and March 2022. In addition to the clarity required, the resident had already expressed she had lost confidence in the landlord, given her reports about disrepair. Effective and sympathetic communication can assist in rebuilding a landlord and tenant relationship. The level of communication, in the circumstances, was not satisfactory and the Ombudsman finds service failure in that regard.

The landlord’s response to the resident’s request to buy back the property.

  1. The resident reported that she wanted the landlord to buy the property back because of the disrepair and her concerns about fire safety. While the resident intended to sell, which she did in January 2023, there was no evidence at the time that there were reasons for her to move, other than the disrepair and her safety concerns, or that the property was on the market.
  2. The landlord’s stance regarding buying back the property was reasonable. A sale, even in the context of social housing, is a commercial transaction between the parties. While the landlord did not consider options such as equity release, it offered the resident other options. A landlord also has to consider protecting and preserving its assets for the sake of the public good. While the Ombudsman would expect a landlord to consider offering the resident options and addressing their particular concerns, it was reasonable that the landlord offered to buy back a property only in very exceptional circumstances, as cited by the landlord’s policy.
  3. It was reasonable of the landlord to offer alternatives should the resident be experiencing financial difficulties or if she needed to relocate. The Ombudsman does not find service failure in that regard.

The landlord’s complaint handling

  1. It was concerning that the landlord did not appear to be aware on 25 March 2021 that a survey had been carried out, given the engineer’s report of 31 March 2021 referred to his inspection of 23 March 2021. However, the concern is mitigated by the fact the survey had only just been carried out.
  2. There was a brief delay in the landlord’s first response which the landlord acknowledged but did not explain. The landlord acted reasonably and promptly in setting out the resident’s amended complaint of 1 April 2021.
  3. The landlord reasonably accepted the resident changing the nature of her complaint. This was proportionate as the issues were very closely linked. She was alarmed that the EWS1 had disclosed that remedial works were required.
  4. However, the landlord missed the main points of the resident’s complaint which were her concerns about fire safety, rather than the delay of the EWS1. The two issues are separate but linked. The EWS1 was a lender requirement but the outcome was an assessment of whether remedial works were required. The main concern is that the landlord would assessing the safety of the building. Given the first response was sent without the benefit of the EWS1, the Ombudsman would have expected the landlord to follow this up in any event.
  5. The landlord failed to address the resident’s assertion that there was missing documentation. It was unreasonable not to investigate or explain the point, in particular as the resident had identified the surveyor who she said had given her the information.
  6. While the landlord compensated the resident for the brief delay in the landlord’s response, the Ombudsman finds service failure in that, while it explained the circumstances and set out its next steps, it did not address the resident’s concerns about missing documentation and it did not seek to reassure her about fire safety but focussed on the EWS1. It did not provide full information such as a timeline to date, or explain the delay in instructing an engineer to carry out the initial investigation in March 2021. While it is noted that it explained matters more fully in response to the resident’s subsequent complaint, the Ombudsman finds service failure.

Determination (decision)

  1. In accordance with Paragraph 52 of the Housing Ombudsman Scheme, there was no maladministration in relation to the landlord’s response to the resident’s request for a EWS1 and her concerns about fire safety.
  2. In accordance with Paragraph 52 of the Housing Ombudsman Scheme, there was service failure in relation to the landlord’s level of communication.
  3. In accordance with Paragraph 52 of the Housing Ombudsman Scheme, there was no maladministration in relation to the landlord’s response to the resident’s request to buy back the property from her.
  4. In accordance with Paragraph 52 of the Housing Ombudsman Scheme, there was service failure in relation to the landlord’s complaint handling.

Reasons

  1. There was no evidence that the landlord was aware of the cladding issues at the time of the sale to the resident in 2019. In any event, it is for the buyer to seek advice and make enquiries. While the evidence indicated that the landlord was prompted to obtain an EWS1 by another resident, the landlord’s decision and the steps it took in relation to carrying out investigations were reasonable.
  2. The landlord was not sufficiently proactive in ensuring it communicated its intentions and steps it would be taking about the fire safety of the building.
  3. While the resident was distressed by the situation she was in, a landlord’s decision whether to buy back a property involves a number of significant factors, and it is discretionary. The landlord offered alternatives. In the circumstances, the Ombudsman does not find its decision to be unreasonable.
  4. The landlord did not take the opportunity of the complaints to improve its communication, it did not appreciate that the resident’s concerns were about fire safety and it did not fully address her issues.

Orders

  1. The landlord is ordered to pay the resident compensation in the amount of £325 including the £25 already offered to the resident within 4 weeks as follows:
    1. £150 in relation to its communication.
    2. £150 in relation to complaint handling
  2. The landlord should confirm compliance with the above order to the Housing Ombudsman Service within 4 weeks of this report.

Recommendations

  1. The Ombudsman makes the following recommendations:
    1. The landscape of building fire safety has changed since 2021 with the advent of the Building Safety Act 2022. However, the principles remain the same, including the importance of effective communication and that the landlord addresses the particular circumstances of the resident. The Ombudsman makes a recommendation that it delivers training, highlighting the points in the Spotlight report and its follow up report .Ombudsman’s latest cases show landlords ‘still have learning to do’ in dealing with cladding and fire safety complaints – Housing Ombudsman (housing-ombudsman.org.uk)
    2. The landlord should notify the Ombudsman of its intentions regarding this recommendation within four weeks of this report.